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Abstract 
Social Networking Sites (SNS) can provide cybercriminals with various opportunities, including 
gathering of user data and login credentials to enable fraud, and the directing of users towards 
online locations which may install malware onto their devices. The techniques employed by such 
cybercriminals can include clickbait (text or video), advertisement of non-existent but potentially 
desirable products, and hoax competitions/giveaways. This study aimed to identify risk factors 
associated with falling victim to these malicious techniques. An online survey was completed of 295 
Malaysian undergraduate students, finding that over one-third had fallen victim to SNS scams. 
Logistic regression analysis identified several victimisation risk factors including having higher scores 
in impulsivity (specifically cognitive complexity), using fewer devices for SNS, and having been on 
SNS for a longer duration. No reliable model was found for vulnerability to hoax valuable gift 
giveaways and ‘friend view application’ advertising specifically, but vulnerability to video clickbait 
was predicted by lower extraversion scores, higher levels of openness to experience, using fewer 
devices, and being on SNS for a longer duration. Other personality traits were not associated with 
either overall victimisation susceptibility, or increased risk of falling victim to the specific techniques. 
However, age approached significance within both the video clickbait and overall victimisation 
models. These findings suggest that Routine Activity Theory may be particularly beneficial in 
understanding and preventing SNS scam victimisation. 
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Introduction 
Social Networking Sites (SNS) have enabled a variety of frauds and scams1-3. Cybercriminals may 
gather login credentials and other confidential information by utilising various strategies to persuade 
users to share personal data2. These malicious techniques can include: ‘clickbait’ content promising 
highly entertaining videos or text; the advertising of special giveaways or competitions; and the 
advertising of desirable products, which are commonly in the form of applications which would 
permit users to know how frequently other specific users visit their profile pages, but in reality, no 
such application exists2. The specific techniques of the scam vary, for example malware might 
sometimes be installed on the user’s device, while other times the cybercriminal may require the 
user to provide banking or personal data. In most cases the scam requires the user to knowingly or 
unknowingly provide the cybercriminal with access to their SNS account, which is then automatically 
used by the application software to further disseminate the malicious application, and may be used 
by the cybercriminal to gather additional data about the victim. In many cases the re-disseminated 
malicious application gives the appearance of being knowingly shared by the victim which may 
encourage contacts of the user to also fall victim to the scam as the content appears to have been 
endorsed by someone they know.  The increased prevalence of these scams alongside the massive 
popularity of SNS necessitates the understanding of the risk factors associated with falling victim so 
that more effective strategies may be employed to protect users.   
 
Agustina has argued for an increased focus on victimological perspectives for both understanding 
and preventing cybercrime4. An increasing number of articles have considered the victims of online 
fraud5-7 although it must also be remembered that data collection methodologies may impact on the 
reliability of the data obtained from victims (e.g. the terminology used when describing the crime)8, 
and so victim research must be conducted carefully.  Nonetheless, certain factors have been 
 
 
4 
 
associated with higher risk of online fraud, such as being ‘younger-old’ (with an average age of late 
60s), having a high level of education, and higher depression scores9. 
 
Some research has focused on the cognitive elements of victimisation, with scam susceptibility 
associated with poor decision-making, arising from both cognitive and motivational factors10. 
Overconfidence, which may arise due to confirmation bias11, may be an example of a cognitive 
factor, while desire (for information, a product, or entertainment) may be an example of a 
motivation leading to engagement with online scams. Optimism bias12 (or the tendency for one to 
underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes) may also be a factor in victimisation – as 
Wiederhold notes, the potential of immediate gratification and optimism bias may encourage some 
individuals to engage in riskier decision making13. 
 
In addition to psychological and communication theories, criminological theories may also be of 
assistance in developing our understanding of why victimisation occurs. Routine Activity Theory14 
(RAT) is widely discussed in criminology, and describes how a criminal act requires three 
components to be simultaneously present: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence 
of a capable guardian. The importance of RAT in understanding cybercrime has been identified for 
over fifteen years15 and theories such as RAT have been applied to cybercrime victims4. Specifically, 
RAT has been applied to phishing victims in the Netherlands, but found no particular group which 
was more likely to be victimised, and no effect of anti-virus software as a guardian16.  However, RAT 
may still be useful in understanding SNS victimisation as the likely offender may be ‘present’ for 
substantial durations of time due to automated software, while the more time that an individual 
spends on SNS, the more likely they are to come across such software and become a suitable target.  
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The personality traits of the five-factor model may provide some insights into victim proneness for 
SNS fraud and scams. Tendencies towards agreeableness and extraversion may heighten 
victimisation risk on SNS due to the inherent interactions with others. For example, Orchard and 
colleagues noted how extraverts were motivated to use SNS to make new connections, potentially 
opening them up to new sources of fraud17. Other factors such as neuroticism and conscientiousness 
may reduce victimisation risk18, as heightened anxiety and attention to detail may result in a more 
security-conscious user. Another important personality trait related to fraud susceptibility may be 
impulsivity. Burgard and Schlembach suggest that fraud victimisation begins when a user 
experiences a reduction in levels of risk awareness and hence caution is diminished, permitting 
engagement with strangers19. Their perspective of the situation becomes unrealistic, and self-
deceptive tendencies may emerge. Using the UPPS-R impulsivity scale, Whitty et al found that a lack 
of perseverance (but not pre-meditation, urgency, or sensation seeking) was associated with 
password sharing among professionals20. However, their study did not examine who these 
passwords were shared with – while it may be with fraudsters, it was possibly with friends and 
family.  
 
Impulsivity is a complex construct. The ‘Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11’ (BIS-11)21 specifically 
identifies six first order factors, which can be combined into three second order factors and an 
overall impulsivity score. The second order factor of ‘motor impulsiveness’ comprises of the first 
order factors ‘motor’ and ‘perseverance’. ‘Motor’ related characteristics include acting impulsively 
without thinking things through, being quick to come to decisions, spending beyond earnings, and 
being ‘happy-go-lucky’, while ‘perseverance’ is characterised by frequently changing jobs and/or 
residences and lack of future orientation. The second order factor of ‘non-planning impulsiveness’ is 
comprised of ‘self-control’ and ‘cognitive complexity’. ‘Self-control’ is characterised by advance 
planning of tasks, excursions, and job security, while ‘cognitive complexity’ includes factors such as a 
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dislike of thinking about complex problems, high levels of boredom when solving thought problems, 
and disliking puzzle-solving. Finally, the second order factor of ‘attentional impulsiveness’ comprises 
of the first order factors ‘attention’ and ‘cognitive stability’. ‘Attention’ considers factors relating to 
concentration and restlessness during lengthy events such as lectures or plays, while ‘cognitive 
stability’ relates to tendencies towards racing or extraneous thoughts. Based on these first-order 
dimensions and what we know about how SNS frauds operate, it is possible that the first order 
impulsivity factors of ‘motor’ and ‘cognitive complexity’ may provide the greatest indicators of 
victimisation risk, although other dimensions may also play a role and will be examined in this study. 
It should also be noted that the perseverance measure in the UPPS-R scale used by Whitty et al20 is 
not directly comparable to the definition used in the BIS-11, with the UPPS-R scale focusing on traits 
which are more similar to the ‘Attention’ scale in the BIS-11. 
 
The Current Study 
As there is little previous literature regarding victimisation risk factors for online fraud, and even less 
relating to SNS scams in particular, the current research aims to further understanding of how SNS 
usage factors and personality might provide indicators of victimisation risk. The study seeks to 
identify if personality, impulsivity, SNS routine usage, and years using SNS are indicators of SNS scam 
victimisation.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students of a Malaysian university who completed the study for 
course credit (students were permitted to select from a range of research projects to fulfil the 
course credit requirement, and so were under no obligation to participate in this specific research). 
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Social media is very popular in Malaysia, with 73 percent of internet users accessing Facebook 
daily22. A total of 320 participants completed some of the study requirements, but 21 responses 
were deemed to be insufficiently complete to allow analysis, and a further four age-related outliers 
were removed (aged 27-40 years). The majority of respondents were female (n=218; 73.9%), and 21 
years old (n=84; 28.5%) with age ranging from 18-26 years (mean = 21.29; sd = 1.572). Most 
participants were Chinese-Malaysian in ethnicity (n=132; 44.7%) with the second largest group 
indicating their ethnicity as Asian Chinese (n=80; 27.1%). Other Malaysian ethnicities comprised 
19.3% of the sample (n=57). The remainder were from mixed or other ethnicities.  
Age frequencies, participant routine usage and years of usage of SNS use are presented in Table 1.  
Most participants (n=259; 87.8%) used SNS on two or three different types of device (laptop, 
smartphone, tablet, eReader, etc.). The mean number of devices used was 2.45 (sd = 0.699). 
Table 1: Participant age, routine usage and years of usage of social networking sites  
 Frequency Percent 
Age   
18 5 1.7 
19 31 10.6 
20 53 18.1 
21 84 28.7 
22 65 22.2 
23 34 11.6 
24 7 2.4 
25 10 3.4 
26 4 1.4 
   
Years using SNS   
1-3 years 5 1.7 
4-5 years 52 17.8 
More than 5 years 235 80.5 
   
Routine Usage of SNS   
Less than once per week 2 .7 
Several times per week 10 3.6 
About once per day 15 5.3 
Several times per day 105 37.4 
About once per hour 32 11.4 
Several times per hour 117 41.6 
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Materials 
Social Networking Site Usage 
Three questions examined general use of SNS, specifically regarding duration of use (years of usage), 
routine usage schedule (frequency of use), and devices utilised for SNS access.  
SNS Fraud Victimisation 
Awareness of SNS fraud was measured. Participants were presented with three different types of 
malicious SNS posts or apps and asked to indicate if they had seen such posts before, if they had 
guessed that it may have been a scam, and if they had fallen victim to the post (by clicking on it). 
Specifically, participants were asked about a) posts promoting applications which indicated that they 
would provide information about which of their friends frequently viewed the user’s profile (‘Friend 
Views App’); b) posts which suggested that those who followed their link would receive a valuable 
gift (‘Valuable Gift App’); and c) posts which suggested that their friend had liked an especially 
outlandish or bizarre video and provided a link to that video (‘Clickbait Video’). For each type of post 
participants were provided with images of real malicious posts of that genre gathered from social 
media as examples (three images were provided for each of the ‘Friend Views App’ and ‘Clickbait 
Video’ types, while two images were provided for the ‘Valuable Gift App’). Participants were also 
encouraged to describe any other potential fraudulent post which they may have seen on SNS. 
These descriptions allowed the researchers to identify if the post identified by the participant was 
actually an SNS scam, or not. Where an SNS scam was detected by this description, the participant 
data was coded accordingly. Those who had fallen victim to any of these posts were asked further 
open-ended questions regarding their experiences.  
Big Five Inventory (BFI-44) 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI-44) is a 44-item inventory examining the big five personality 
dimensions23-25. Participants respond to each item on the inventory using a 5-point Likert scale from 
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‘Disagree strongly’ to ‘Agree strongly’. This personality inventory has been widely used, 
demonstrating good validity and reliability26.  
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale21 (BIS-11) is a 30-item self-report inventory using a 4-point Likert 
scale (‘Rarely/Never’ to ‘Almost Always/Always’). It includes six first order factors and three second 
order factors. This study utilises the first order factors as predictor variables in order to fully examine 
the range of facets in this trait27. The BIS-11 has also been widely used and found to be reliable 
across a wide range of populations27.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the survey online. Informed consent was obtained and demographic 
information was collected. Further questions were presented in the order described in the Materials 
section. Following completion of the study the participants were provided with links to further 
information regarding online fraud. 
 
Results 
The majority of participants (n=177; 60.2%) had heard of SNS fraud, with 54 (18.4%) unsure if they 
had heard of it prior to the study. Over one-third of participants had fallen victim to one or more 
types of malicious post (n=100; 33.9%), with only 13 (4.4%) being unaware of having ever seen such 
a post or were unaware of its malicious nature. The frequency of victimisation of the sub-types of 
malicious posts is presented in Table 2. Most victims had only clicked on such posts once (n=51; 
53.1%), although a substantial minority had clicked on such posts 2-3 times (n=40; 41.7%). 
Descriptive statistics for the BFI44 and the BIS11 are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 2: Victimisation of malicious posts on SNS 
 Friend Views 
App 
Valuable gift 
app 
Clickbait video Other 
potential 
scam 
Seen and fell victim 28 (9.5%) 27 (9.2%) 76 (25.8%) 13 (4.4%) 
Seen and did not click 
(identified it as a scam)  
198 (67.1%) 199 (67.5%) 164 (55.6%) 110 (37.3%) 
Seen and did not click 
(unaware it was a scam) 
47 (15.9%) 38 (12.9%) 39 (13.2%) 21 (7.1%) 
Never seen app  18 (6.1%) 23 (7.8%) 7 (2.4%) 51 (17.3%) 
Unsure if ever seen app 4 (1.4%) 1 (0.3%) 5 (1.7%) 95 (32.2%) 
Unanswered 0 (0.0%) 7 (2.4%) 4 (1.4%) 5 (1.7%) 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for BFI44 and BIS11  
 Min. Max. Mean SD 
Extraversion 20 34 25.29 2.143 
Agreeableness 22 35 28.18 2.207 
Conscientiousness 21 35 27.49 2.490 
Neuroticism 22 31 26.32 1.817 
Openness 29 44 36.03 2.863 
Attention 5 19 11.10 2.329 
Cognitive Instability 3 12 7.12 1.835 
Motor 8 28 14.86 3.365 
Perseverance 4 13 7.46 1.755 
Self-Control 6 24 13.45 3.302 
Cognitive Complexity 6 17 11.69 2.118 
 
A series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine the factors which successfully 
predict victimisation of SNS fraud enabling scams. Victimisation was recoded into ‘Victimised’ or ‘Not 
victimised due to suspicion of a scam’. Other outcomes (lack of awareness of it being a scam, 
uncertainty regarding prior history, and lack of history of viewing this type of material) were 
removed from the analysis to permit clear distinction between those who had fallen victim to the 
scam and those who did not fall victim by identifying its malicious nature. Due to the exclusion of 
these outcomes, combined with missing values for some predictor variables, the number of cases 
varies in each analysis. Predictor variables examined were gender, age, length of time using SNS, 
routine usage of SNS, total number of devices used to access SNS, agreeableness, extraversion, 
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conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to new experiences, and the 6 first level outputs of the 
BIS11 (attention, cognitive instability, motor, perseverance, self-control, cognitive complexity). The 
variables of length of time using SNS and routine usage of SNS were captured via nominal data and 
were recoded for analytic purposes into two categories each – fewer or more than 5 years of use, 
and less or more than hourly usage each day.  
 
Using logistic regression analysis to identify factors influencing victimisation, the model could not 
significantly predict victimisation for ‘friend views app’ posts, (N=172, χ2(16) = 17.198, p = .373), 
‘valuable gift app’ posts, (N=169, χ2(16) = 22.609, p = .125); or for other posts identified as scam by 
the participants (N=90, χ2(16) = 20.815, p = .186).  
 
However, the model did significantly predict clickbait video victimisation (N=179, χ2(16) = 40.522, p = 
.001). The model accounted for between 20.3% and 28.4% of the variance in victimisation status, 
with 91.0% of non-victims successfully predicted. The victimised group were predicted with 47.4% 
accuracy. Overall accuracy of the model was 77.1%. Extraversion scores, openness to experience, 
total number of devices used for SNS and length of time using SNS reliability predicted victimisation 
(see Table 4). Age approached significance for prediction of victimisation (p = .058).  
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Table 4:  
Logistic regression analysis predicting victimisation of video posts 
 B S.E. Wald Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. 
Lower Upper 
Age .234 .123 3.585 1.263 .992 1.609 
Total number of devices -.904** .295 9.408 .405 .227 .722 
Extraversion -.230* .097 5.647 .794 .657 .960 
Agreeableness .053 .085 .382 1.054 .892 1.246 
Conscientiousness -.087 .087 1.002 .916 .773 1.087 
Neuroticism -.035 .102 .121 .965 .790 1.179 
Openness .148* .074 4.022 1.159 1.003 1.339 
Attention -.130 .103 1.577 .878 .718 1.075 
Cognitive Instability .032 .117 .075 1.032 .821 1.297 
Motor .042 .074 .327 1.043 .902 1.206 
Perseverance .089 .125 .507 1.093 .856 1.395 
Self-Control .031 .070 .189 1.031 .898 1.184 
Cognitive Complexity .141 .110 1.655 1.151 .929 1.427 
Gender .541 .409 1.747 1.717 .770 3.827 
SNS years of use† -1.835** .621 8.725 .160 .047 .539 
Routine SNS use† .631 .383 2.705 1.879 .886 3.984 
Constant -3.662 5.797 .399 .026   
 
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; †Parameter coding during logistic regression 
results in negative B value being associated with increased years of SNS usage/more frequent SNS 
routine usage.  
 
Overall Victimisation 
Victimisation of any type of deviant post was determined and utilised as the dependent variable. The 
full model significantly predicted victimisation (N=214, χ2(16) = 36.068, p = .003). The model 
accounted for between 15.5% and 21.6% of the variance in victimisation status, with 88.9% of non-
victims successfully predicted. However, only 37.1% of predictions for the victimised group were 
accurate. Overall accuracy of the model was 72.0%. Total number of devices used for SNS, length of 
time using SNS, and cognitive complexity reliably predicted victimisation (see Table 5).  Age 
approached significance for prediction of victimisation (p = .061). 
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Table 5:  
Logistic regression analysis predicting victimisation of any deviant post 
 B S.E. Wald Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. 
Lower Upper 
Age .203 .108 3.505 1.225 .991 1.516 
Total number of devices -.818*** .254 10.401 .441 .268 .725 
Extraversion -.138 .080 2.925 .871 .744 1.020 
Agreeableness .050 .075 .456 1.052 .908 1.218 
Conscientiousness -.008 .077 .012 .992 .853 1.152 
Neuroticism -.089 .089 1.002 .914 .768 1.089 
Openness .093 .063 2.180 1.098 .970 1.243 
Attention -.066 .087 .578 .936 .789 1.110 
Cognitive Instability -.027 .099 .073 .974 .801 1.183 
Motor .046 .061 .569 1.047 .929 1.180 
Perseverance .044 .111 .156 1.045 .840 1.299 
Self-Control .063 .062 1.008 1.065 .942 1.203 
Cognitive Complexity .207* .094 4.835 1.230 1.023 1.480 
Gender .569 .369 2.380 1.766 .858 3.636 
SNS years of use† -1.353** .478 8.000 .258 .101 .660 
Routine SNS use† .461 .340 1.845 1.586 .815 3.085 
Constant -5.403 5.253 1.058 .005   
 
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level; †Parameter coding 
during logistic regression results in negative B value being associated with increased years of SNS 
usage/more frequent SNS routine usage.  
 
Repeat Victimisation 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to identify factors influencing repeat victimisation (i.e., 
where a victim had clicked on more than one malicious post vs. a single instance of victimisation). A 
total of 70 cases were included in this analysis. The model could not significantly predict repeat 
victimisation (N=70, χ2(16) = 14.130, p = .589).   
 
Discussion 
The results of the study indicate that more years of experience using SNS is associated with greater 
likelihood of falling victim to SNS scams. This finding is in line with the predictions based on Routine 
Activity Theory14, with increased presence of an individual on SNS over time resulting in higher 
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victimisation risk. The low association between most impulsivity factors and victimisation was 
unexpected, although the findings were similar to those of previous research20. This may be 
indicative that the findings of Whitty et al20 were not anomalous, and the connection between 
impulsivity and victimisation may be weaker than expected. Nevertheless, it was interesting to note 
that the trait of cognitive complexity was associated with increased risk and so it is possible that very 
specific facets of impulsivity may be helpful in predicting victimisation. The associations between 
introversion/ higher openness to experience and susceptibility to video type scams are of note, 
particularly as these associations were not noticed in the overall victimisation analysis. These 
associations, along with the results for age which approached significance for both the video posts 
and overall victimisation, are worthy of future investigation. As this study involved a relatively young 
sample it would be of particular interest to explore the potential influence of age with samples 
drawn from a wider range of age groups.   
 
It is not clear why those who used fewer devices for SNS were more likely to experience 
victimisation. It is possible that certain types of malicious techniques are displayed more frequently 
on some platforms (e.g. desktop website versions) than others (e.g. smartphone apps). Further 
research should attempt to identify causes for this phenomenon. The Malaysian sample is derived 
from a collectivist-oriented culture28, albeit one which has experienced greater influence from 
individualistic cultures in recent years. It would be of interest to conduct cross-cultural research to 
examine if these findings are also evident in individualistic cultures. It should also be noted that the 
participants in this study were all highly educated, attending undergraduate studies. Further 
research with a broader range of users should be completed. 
 
Overall it would appear that there is no strong connection between social networking site scam 
victimisation and many personality traits and impulsivity factors, although it seems that the relative 
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predictive value of some traits varies according to the type of scam involved. This research has 
demonstrated the potential for Routine Activity Theory to be applied to SNS scams, which may 
provide opportunities for victimisation prevention, as well as identifying the role of SNS usage and 
cognitive complexity in potential victimisation.  
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